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Abstract
Analyzing simple and natural price-adjustment processes that converge to a market equilibrium is
a fundamental question in economics. Such an analysis may have implications in economic theory,
computational economics, and distributed systems. Taˆtonnement, proposed by Walras in 1874, is a
process by which prices go up in response to excess demand, and down in response to excess supply.
This paper analyzes the convergence of a time-discrete taˆtonnement process, a problem that recently
attracted considerable attention of computer scientists. We prove that the simple taˆtonnement process
that we consider converges (efficiently) to equilibrium prices and allocation in markets with nested
CES-Leontief utilities, generalizing some of the previous convergence proofs for more restricted types
of utility functions.
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1 Introduction
Motivation. General equilibrium theory, a cornerstone of microeconomics, deals with markets that con-
sist of agents that are endowed with goods (or money). Each agent wants to maximize its utility. This
may involve exchanging the initial endowment of goods for goods that other agents hold. The exchange of
goods against other goods (or money) is governed by prices that are set to guarantee a market equilibrium
where supply equals demand. In this context, an issue that was raised already by the founders of this the-
ory is that justifying market equilibrium as a likely outcome of exchange requires suggesting a plausible
market dynamic that leads to equilibrium. In other words, proving that some simple, natural, decentralized
price-adjustment process converges quickly to a market equilibrium is a fundamental challenge of general
equilibrium theory. Indeed, Walras [22] proposed such a process which he named taˆtonnement. In this
process, prices are adjusted upwards in response to excess demand and downwards in response to excess
supply. (Notice that while buyers are expected to react to price changes by maximizing their utility sub-
ject to their budget constraints, the price changes themselves cannot be justified based on the incentives
of the sellers.) In modern economic thought, taˆtonnement is regarded as a model for a centrally planned
economy rather than a decentralized market economy. In other words, it is considered a method of com-
putation rather than a spontaneous market process. A scenario where this view of taˆtonnement might be
useful arises in the context of distributed large-scale computer systems, such as clouds. Artificial markets
can be set to facilitiate cooperative sharing of computing, storage, and communication resources among
selfish agents (see, for example, [6, 25, 23]). Often, a service provider either controls the dispersed re-
sources, or at least regulates the peer-to-peer interaction among the users, thus enforcing adherence to the
price adjustment protocol (see, for instance, [1, 24]). On the other hand, the buying agents are still free to
pursue their goals without having to formulate and disclose their utility functions beyond their reactions to
the changing prices. (One of the reasons that this is important is that the conventional economic interpre-
tation of utility functions is that they are a convenient expression of a preference order on the continuum
of consumption baskets, rather than a meaningful and conscious numerical evaluation of each basket.)
Our results. We consider in this paper the following simple discrete taˆtonnement rule. For some fixed
ǫ ą 0, for every good, its price pptq at time t “ 1, 2, 3, . . . is given by
pptq “ p1´ ǫq ¨ ppt´ 1q ` ǫ ¨ fptq ¨ ppt´ 1q, (1)
where fptq is the total demand for this good assuming the prices at time t´ 1 (the supply is always scaled
to 1). We prove that this process converges to equilibrium prices and allocation in various Eisenberg-Gale
markets, most notably markets with nested CES-Leontief utility functions. We also note that the rate of
convergence gives a polynomial time algorithm for computing an approximate equilibrium—the precise
bounds are stated in Sections 4, 5, and 6. Most previous results on the convergence of discrete versions of
taˆtonnement apply to special cases of our results. Our results apply to utility functions for which previous
work did not establish convergence of taˆtonnement. We note that resource sharing in computer systems
may require rather complicated utility functions that could not be handled by previous work (for instance,
users may desire a combination of alternative bundles of resources).
Markets. A Fisher market (see [20]) is composed of a set of agents and a set of perfectly divisible goods,
each of limited quantity. Each agent is endowed with a budget and a utility function on the possible baskets
of goods. The goal of an agent is to spend the budget to buy an optimal basket of goods which maximizes
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the agent’s utility subject to the budget constraint. An equilibrium consists of an assignment of prices
to goods and an optimal purchase of goods by each agent in which the market clears, i.e., the demand
for each good equals to its supply. Eisenberg-Gale markets [15] are a rather general special case, where
the utility functions are such that equilibrium prices and allocation can be formulated as the solutions
to dual convex programs, originally due to Eisenberg and Gale [13] and extended in [12, 18, 10, 16].
Fisher markets are a special case of the more general Walrasian model [22] of an exchange economy.
Arrow and Debreu [4] proved, using the Kakutani fixed-point theorem, that in a Walrasian market, if the
utility functions are continuous, strictly monotone, and quasi-concave, then an equilibrium always exists.
However, their proof gives no indication of the market dynamics that might lead to an equilibrium.
Markets are often classified according to the type of utility functions used. Utility functions are usually
assumed to be concave and monotonically non-decreasing. (Economically, the former assumption is the
law of diminishing marginal utility, and the latter is implied by assuming free disposal.) A utility function
of the form
upxq “
˜
mÿ
j“1
a
ρ
jx
ρ
j
¸1{ρ
,
where ρ P p´8, 0q Y p0, 1s, is called a utility with constant elasticity of substitution or a CES utility.
CES utilities with ρ P p0, 1s are a special case of utilities that satisfy the weak gross substitutes (WGS)
property—increasing the price of a good does not decrease the demand for any other good. If ρ “ 1, this
is a linear utility. In CES utilities with ρ ă 0, the goods are complementary. The limit of upxq as ρÑ ´8
is called a Leontief utility, and the limit as ρ Ñ 0 is called a Cobb-Douglas utility. A utility function of
the form
upxq “
¨˝
kÿ
j1“1
c
ρ1
j1
˜
mÿ
j2“1
a
ρ2
j1,j2
x
ρ2
j1,j2
¸ρ1{ρ2‚˛1{ρ1
is a (two-level) nested CES utility (see [17]). A resource allocation utility (see [18]) is a nested linear-
Leontief utility (ρ1 “ 1 and ρ2 “ ´8). An exponential utility (a.k.a. constant absolute risk aversion
utility) is a simple example of a utility that does not exhibit constant elasticity of substitution. It has the
form
upxq “
mÿ
j“1
aj
`
1´ e´θxj
˘
.
Taˆtonnement. The idea of taˆtonnement is due to Walras [22]. Arrow et al. [3] showed that a time-
continuous version of taˆtonnement converges to equilibrium for WGS utilities. Scarf [19] gave examples
of Arrow-Debreu markets with non-WGS utilities (in particular Leontief utilities) where specific imple-
mentations of taˆtonnement cycle and never converge to an equilibrium.
The more recent computer science literature considers discrete versions of taˆtonnement in Fisher mar-
kets. (Discrete taˆtonnement was also discussed in the economics literature, see [21].) Codenotti et al. [9]
show that a taˆtonnement-like process involving some price coordination converges in polynomial time
for WGS utilities. Another taˆtonnement-like process that involves coordination is analyzed in Fleischer
et al. [14]. They show, for many interesting markets, a weak form of convergence of the process. They
consider the average of the prices and allocations over the steps of the process and show that they con-
verge to a weak notion of approximate equilibrium, which satisfies only the sum of budget constraints of
the agents. On the other hand, their results apply to a wide range of markets. In particular, they apply
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to all the markets where we demonstrate explicit bounds on convergence to our much stronger notion of
approximate equilibrium.
The first result to demonstrate the convergence to equilibrium of a true discrete taˆtonnement process is
due to Cole and Fleischer [11], who showed that the prices converge to equilibrium prices for non-linear
CES utilities that satisfy WGS (i.e., ρ P p0, 1q) and for Cobb-Douglas utilities. They analyze the same
price-adjustment process given in Equation (1). Their analysis relies on a strong property that they prove:
in the cases they analyze the price of each good moves towards the equilibrium value at each iteration. This
is generally false for non-WGS utilities. Nevertheless, Cheung et al. [8] modified the analysis to apply to
some non-WGS utilities, including complementary CES utilities with ρ P p´1, 0q, two-level nested CES
utilities with ρ1, ρ2 ą ´1, and even multi-level nested CES utilities with some restrictions on the elasticity
(which do not breach the lower bound of ´1). It should be noted that the analysis of [11, 8] applies also
to a model of asynchronous price adjustments. Asynchrony is clearly a desirable property of a plausible
dynamic for a market economy (though, as mentioned above, taˆtonnement is perhaps not the right process
to consider in that case) or a true peer-to-peer system. Our results, while applicable to a wider range of
utility functions, assume synchronous price adjustments.
Recently, Cheung et al. [7] show that a discrete taˆtonnement process that uses an exponential function
update rule (Equation (1) can be thought of as a linearization of their rule) converges to the optimal value of
the Eisenberg-Gale convex program, for complementary CES utilities and for Leontief utilities, i.e. for all
ρ P r´8, 0q. We note that our Lemma 8 shows that in the cases that they analyze, the convergence of the
convex program objective function also implies convergence to equilibrium (in the same sense that we use
in our results). The analysis of [7] relates their process to generalized gradient descent using a judicious
choice of a Bregman divergence. In comparison, our main result uses the multiplicative weights update
paradigm (see [2]). It is well-known that multiplicative weights update analysis and gradient descent
are dual arguments. We note that there is no Bregman divergence that yields the linear descent step of
Equation (1) (which is not to say that the analysis of [7] cannot be adapted to apply to the linear update
that we use here). We further note that like our analysis, the results in [7] only apply to synchronous price
adjustments.
Discussion and comparison. In Section 4 we give a proof of convergence via gradient descent that
applies in particular to the CES utilities analyzed in [11, 8, 7], is somewhat simpler than the proof in [7],
and gives similar bounds on the rate of convergence. Our analysis of nested CES-Leontief utilities in
Section 5 is new. Our results for nested CES-Leontief utilities give an upper bound on the convergence
rate which is proportional to 1{δ3. For Leontief utilities, the analysis in [7] combined with our Lemma 8
gives a better bound proportional to 1{δ2.
The pervasive application of the multiplicative weights update method uses ǫ that depends on the
desired accuracy of the outcome, and proves the convergence of a solution that averages over the iterations.
Nevertheless, we show convergence of the sequence of prices (and allocations), and not just convergence
of average prices (clearly implied by the former), and we show this for a fixed ǫ in Equation (1) that is
independent of the desired closeness to equilibrium.
The techniques in [14] are somewhat similar to ours. However, they only prove the convergence of the
average, and they use a much weaker notion of approximate equilibrium. On the other hand, that allows
them to apply their results directly to utility functions for which our stronger notion of convergence is
unlikely to hold, such as linear or resource allocation utilities. By tweaking the taˆtonnement process, we
can handle these utilities as well. This is briefly discussed and analyzed in Section ??. In this context, we
note that whether one is interested in convergence of the sequence or in convergence of the average depends
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on the phenomenon that is being modeled. One can think of taˆtonnement as a negotiation process—the
price setters propose prices and collect purchase offers to study the market, while no exchange actually
occurs during the process. In this case, convergence of the sequence seems more suitable. An alternative
view of taˆtonnement is that of an “exploration” process—the price setters actually sell a fraction of the
supply at each step of the process at the prices of that step. In this case, one would focus on convergence
of the average. (A more rigorous treatment of this interpretation is given by the ongoing markets model
of [11, 8].) Our proofs imply that taking the average over the steps of the prices and the allocations yields
a somewhat relaxed notion of an approximate equilibrium.
Finally, we discuss the robustness of our results. For simplicity, we assume that throughout the process
the prices satisfy the condition that their sum equals the total budget available to the agents. This condition
is easy to satisfy initially, without explicit coordination of the prices. For example, set each price to be
arbitrary (but strictly positive), and at the first round reset the price of each good to be the total money
spent on the good, given the initial arbitrary prices. Once the assumption is satisfied, it is maintained if the
process is carried out precisely. However, we note that even if the initial prices deviate from satisfying this
assumption, and the price adjustment or even the responses of the agents are perturbed, the convergence
theorems would still hold under trivial modifications. (However, note that the initial prices must be strictly
positive—taˆtonnement cannot recover from zero prices). In particular, the proof of Proposition 6 also
implies that the prices converge very quickly towards satisfying the above assumption. Once the sum of
prices is close to the sum of budgets, the rest of the proof can be modified to the slight deviation from
equality and also to slight deviations from optimality of the responses of the agents.
2 Fisher Markets
Here we present the Fisher market model and some basic definitions. In a Fisher market there are m
perfectly divisible goods, each with quantity scaled to 1, without loss of generality. There are n agents.
Each agent i is endowed with a budget of bi, and aims at maximizing a concave utility function ui : Rm` Ñ
R`. We’ll assume monotonicity, so each agent spends all its budget. Given monotonicity, we may assume
without loss of generality that for every agent i, uip~0q “ 0. Also without loss of generality, we will assume
throughout the paper that the budgets are scaled so that
řn
i“1 bi “ 1.
A market equilibrium is a pair pp, xq where p : t1, 2, . . . , mu Ñ R` is an assignment of non-negative
prices to the goods, and x : t1, 2, . . . , nu ˆ t1, 2, . . . , mu Ñ R` is an allocation of goods to agents,
satisfying the following conditions: (i) The total spendřmj“1 pjxij of agent i is at most bi. (ii) The basket
of goods xi that agent i gets maximizes the utility ui for any basket whose cost is at most bi. (iii) The total
demand
řn
i“1 xij for good j is at most 1. (iv) If the total demand for good j is less than 1, then pj “ 0.
Let xippq denote the optimal basket of goods maximizing the utility ui of agent i, under the budget
constraint bi and the market prices p. Notice that xippq is given by a solution to the following convex
program:
xippq “ arg max
xiPRm`
#
uipxiq :
mÿ
j“1
pjxij ď bi
+
.
We assume that computing an optimal basket is a tractable problem. Further denote by
zjppq fl
nÿ
i“1
xijppq ´ 1
4
the excess demand for good j under the prices p. Notice that an equilibrium price vector p˚ satisfies
p˚ P B, where
B “
#
p P Rm` :
mÿ
j“1
pj “
nÿ
i“1
bi
+
.
We now define the notion of approximate equilibrium. We give two alternative definitions. In the first
definition, each agent buys an optimal basket of goods subject to the prices, but the demand for each good
may exceed the supply by a little. In the second definition, each agent buys a near-optimal basket of
goods, and the supply constraints are satisfied. Definion 1 implies Definition 2 (possibly with a change
of the approximation guarantee δ) in many interesting markets. This is the case when a small change in
allocation results in a small change in utility. Also, Definition 2 implies Definition 1 in many interesting
markets. Specifically, if given specific prices, the optimal allocation for each player is unique and the utility
functions are strongly concave, then this is the case. Definition 2 is more natural when the allocations are
very sensitive to small changes in the prices (one such example is the case of linear utilities).
The definition that we use in most of the paper is:
Definition 1. A price-demand pair pp, xq is a δ-approximate equilibrium iff
P1. For every agent i “ 1, 2, . . . , n, the demand of i optimizes the utility of i given the prices p: xi “
xippq.
P2. For every good j “ 1, 2, . . . , m, the demand for j does not exceed the supply by much: zjppq ď δ.
P3. The goods that are not purchased almost entirely do not cost much: For every j “ 1, 2, . . . , m, if
zjppq ă ´δ then pj ď δ.
The alternative definition that is often equivalent to the first one is:
Definition 2. A price-demand pair pp, xq is a δ-approximate equilibrium iff
P1. For every agent i “ 1, 2, . . . , n, the utility of i is near-optimal given the prices p: uipxiq ě p1´ δq ¨
uipxippqq.
P2. For every good j “ 1, 2, . . . , m, the demand for j does not exceed the supply: zjppq ď 0.
P3. The goods that are not purchased almost entirely do not cost much: For every j “ 1, 2, . . . , m, if
zjppq ă ´δ then pj ď δ.
For clarity, we use Dirac’s notation to do linear algebra in a vector space over R endowed with the
standard Euclidean norm. In particular xu | vy denotes the inner product between two vectors u and v, and
xu | A | vy denotes the bilinear map of a pair of vectors u, v using a linear operator A. We denote by R`
the set of non-negative real numbers, and by R`` the set of strictly positive real numbers.
3 The Taˆtonnement Process
In this section, we discuss arbitrary Eisenberg-Gale markets [15]. In an Eisenberg-Gale market, an equi-
librium allocation of goods to agents can be computed using a specific convex program whose objective
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function is strictly concave in the utilities of the agents. The Lagrange variables corresponding to the sup-
ply constraints give the equilibrium prices. Thus, an equilibrium price vector can be computed by solving
the dual program.
Let xi denote a feasible allocation for agent i, so xij is the quantity of good j that agent i gets in
the allocation xi. An equilibrium allocation x˚ is given by the solution to the following Eisenberg-Gale
convex program.
max
řn
i“1 bi ln uipxiq
s.t.
řn
i“1 xij ď 1 @j “ 1, 2, . . . , m
xij ě 0 @i “ 1, 2, . . . , n; @j “ 1, 2, . . . , m.
An equilibrium price vector p˚ is given by the solution to the dual program:
min
řm
j“1 pj `
řn
i“1 g
˚
i pµiq
s.t. pj ě ´µij i “ 1, 2, . . . , n; @j “ 1, 2, . . . , m
pj ě 0 @j “ 1, 2, . . . , m,
where g˚i is the convex conjugate of the convex function gipxiq “ ´bi ln uipxiq. More specifically, g˚i
satisfies g˚i pµiq “ supxPRm` txµi | xy ´ gipxqu. Notice that g
˚
i is monotonically non-decreasing in each
coordinate of µi. Therefore, we can replace µij by ´pj for every i, j. For future use, we denote the primal
objective function by ψpxq “ řni“1 bi ln uipxiq, and the dual objective function by φppq “ řmj“1 pj `řn
i“1 g
˚
i p´pq.
The following lemma gives an explicit expression for the gradient of φ. It appears in [7, Lemma 3.3].
In the appendix, we give the (short) proof for completeness.
Lemma 3 ([7]). In every Eisenberg-Gale market,
∇φppq “ ´zppq.
We also need the following property of the primal objective function.
Claim 4. For every α ą 0, ψ
`
1
1`α
¨ x
˘
ě ψpxq ´ α.
Proof. For every agent i,
ui
ˆ
1
1` α
¨ x
˙
“ ui
ˆ
1
1` α
¨ x`
α
1` α
¨~0
˙
ě
1
1` α
¨ uipxq `
α
1` α
¨ uip~0q “
1
1` α
¨ uipxq,
where the inequality follows from the concavity of ui. Thus,
ψ
ˆ
1
1` α
¨ x
˙
“
nÿ
i“1
bi ln
ˆ
ui
ˆ
1
1` α
¨ x
˙˙
ě
nÿ
i“1
bi ln
ˆ
1
1` α
¨ uipxq
˙
ě ψpxq ´ α,
where the second inequality follows from lnp1` αq ď α and the scaling
řn
i“1 bi “ 1. 
The taˆtonnement process proceeds as follows. Start with an arbitrary assignment of strictly positive
prices p0 P Rm`` X B. Given the time t prices pt, each agent independently responds with its time t ` 1
demand xt`1i fl xipptq. Given the time t ` 1 demands xt`1, the prices of goods are updated according
6
to the excess demand — prices increase for goods whose demand exceeds supply and prices decrease for
goods whose supply exceeds demand. More specifically,
pt`1j “ p
t
j ¨
`
1` εzjpp
tq
˘
,
where ε P p0, 1
2
q is a constant to be specified later.
We now give an alternative characterization of the optimal response of the agents to a price vector.
Lemma 5. Let p P B be a price vector. Then,
xppq “ arg max
xPRnˆm`
#
nÿ
i“1
bi ln uipxiq :
1
}p}1
¨
mÿ
j“1
pj
nÿ
i“1
xij ď 1
+
.
Proof. The proof uses essentially the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 3.
Given a price vector p P B. Consider the following program,
max
#
nÿ
i“1
bi ln uipxiq :
1
}p}1
¨
mÿ
j“1
pj
nÿ
i“1
xij ď 1
+
.
By Lagrange duality we get that the maximum is achieved at
λmax, xmax “ arg max
xPRnˆm` ,λě0
#
nÿ
i“1
bi ln uipxiq ´ λ
˜
1´
mÿ
j“1
pj
}p}1
nÿ
i“1
xij
¸+
.
We will show that λmax “ }p}1 and xmax “ xppq by showing that they satisfy the KKT conditions. The first
condition is that if λmax ą 0 then 1 “
řm
j“1
pj
}p}1
řn
i“1pxmaxqij . By the definition of xppq,
řm
j“1 pjxppqij “
bi (as uipxq is monotonically non-decreasing). Thus, xppq satisfies
řn
i“1
řm
j“1 pjxppqij “
řn
i“1 bi “ }p}1.
For the second KKT condition notice the following. In a market in which every good j has quantityřn
i“1 xppqij , the price-demand pair pp, xppqq is an equilibrium (each agent optimizes its demand and the
market clears). Thus, xppq is a primal optimal solution to the Eisenberg-Gale convex program for this
market. Therefore,
xppq “ arg max
xPRnˆm`
#
nÿ
i“1
bi ln uipxiq :
nÿ
i“1
xij “
nÿ
i“1
xppqij@j
+
“ arg max
xPRnˆm`
#
nÿ
i“1
bi ln uipxiq ´
mÿ
j“1
pj
nÿ
i“1
pxppqij ´ xijq
+
“ arg max
xPRnˆm`
#
nÿ
i“1
bi ln uipxiq ´
mÿ
j“1
pj
nÿ
i“1
p1´ xijq
+
.
The first equation follows from the definition of the Eisenberg-Gale market with quantities
řn
i“1 xppqij .
The second equation follows from Lagrange duality and the fact that the prices p are a dual optimal
solution. The third equation follows as
řm
j“1 pj
řn
i“1 xppqij is a constant independent of x.
Going back to the second KKT condition, notice that putting λmax “ }p}1 gives exactly the last
equation. Therefore, xmax “ xppq, λmax “ }p}1 satisfy the second KKT condition as well. 
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Proposition 6. If p0 P B then pt P B for all t.
Proof. The proof is by induction on t. For t “ 0, the claim is satisfied by assumption. For the inductive
step, notice that
mÿ
j“1
pt`1j “ p1´ ǫq
mÿ
j“1
ptj ` ǫ
mÿ
j“1
ptj
nÿ
i“1
xt`1ij
“ p1´ ǫq
mÿ
j“1
ptj ` ǫ
nÿ
i“1
mÿ
j“1
ptjxijpp
tq “
nÿ
j“1
bi
As we assume that uipxiq is monotonically non-decreasing, by the definition of xippq for every i,
řm
j“1 p
t
jxijpp
tq “
bi (every agent spends all its budget at every round). Thus the last equality follows (together with the in-
duction hypothesis on pt). 
4 Preliminary Results
The following theorem generalizes and simplifies slightly the results of [7, Theorem 6.4] on the conver-
gence of taˆtonnement for CES utility functions (albeit for the linearized version of the process that they
consider).
Theorem 7. Suppose that there is a choice of ε ą 0 and a closed convex set P Ă Rm` which includes
an equilibrium price vector p˚ and the sequence p0, p1, p2, . . . with the following properties: (i) There
are bounds pmin ď pmax such that for all p P P and for all goods j, pj P rpmin, pmaxs. (ii) In P , the
dual objective function φ is twice continuously differentiable and strongly convex, and its gradient ∇φ is
L-Lipschitz. (iii) ε ď pmin
p2maxL
. Then, there exists a constant δ ą 0 such that for every T ě 0,
φppT q ´ φpp˚q ď p1´ δqT ¨
`
φpp0q ´ φpp˚q
˘
.
Proof. The proof closely mimics the proof of convergence of gradient descent in the case of a strongly
convex objective function.
Condition (ii) implies that there exist bounds 0 ă λmin ď λmax such that for every p P P the eigenval-
ues of the Hessian matrix ∇2φppq lie in the interval rλmin, λmaxs.
Set ε “ pmin
p2maxλmax
. Consider a time step t. Consider a point p P P . The second order Taylor expansion
of φppq with respect to φppt´1q gives
φppq “ φppt´1q ` x∇φppt´1q, p´ pt´1y `
1
2
¨ xp´ pt´1 | ∇φpqq | p´ pt´1y,
for some interpolation point q between p and pt´1. As q P P (because P is convex), we have that the last
term satisfies
λmin ¨ }p´ p
t´1}2
2
ď xp´ pt´1 | ∇φpqq | p´ pt´1y ď λmax ¨ }p´ p
t´1}2
2
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Thus, on the one hand,
φpptq ď φppt´1q ` x∇φppt´1q, pt ´ pt´1y `
λmax
2
¨ }pt ´ pt´1}2
2
“ φppt´1q ´ ǫ ¨
ÿ
j
pt´1j
`
∇φppt´1q
˘
2
j
`
λmax
2
¨ ǫ2 ¨
ÿ
j
`
pt´1j ∇φpp
t´1qj
˘
2
ď φppt´1q ´ ǫ ¨ pmin ¨ }∇φpp
t´1q}2
2
`
λmax
2
¨ ǫ2 ¨ p2
max
¨ }∇φppt´1q}2
2
ď φppt´1q ´
ˆ
pmin
pmax
˙
2
¨
1
2λmax
¨ }∇φppt´1q}2
2
.
On the other hand, for every p P P ,
φppq ě φppt´1q ` x∇φppt´1q, p´ pt´1y `
λmin
2
¨ }p´ pt´1}2
2
.
The right-hand side is minimized at p “ pt´1 ´ 1
λmin
¨∇φppt´1q, so we get that for every p,
φppq ě φppt´1q ` x∇φppt´1q,´
1
λmin
¨∇φppt´1qy `
λmin
2
¨
››››´ 1λmin ¨∇φppt´1q
››››2
2
“ φppt´1q ´
1
2λmin
¨ }∇φppt´1q}2
2
.
By setting p “ p˚ on the left-hand side, we get
}∇φppt´1q}2
2
ě 2λmin ¨
`
φppt´1q ´ φpp˚q
˘
.
Subtracting φpp˚q on both sides in the first bound and combining the two bounds we get that
φpptq ´ φpp˚q ď
˜
1´
ˆ
pmin
pmax
˙2
¨
λmin
λmax
¨
¸
¨
`
φppt´1q ´ φpp˚q
˘
.
This recurrence relation implies the theorem. 
The following lemma relates the proximity to the dual objective optimum to the proximity to equilib-
rium.
Lemma 8. Under the same assumptions and notation of Theorem 7, for every δ ą 0, for every p P P , and
for the dual optimal solution p˚, if φppq ď φpp˚q `min
!
1, 1
λ2max
)
¨ 1
2
λminδ
2
, then }p ´ p˚}2 ď δλmax and
|zppq ´ zpp˚q|8 ď δ.
Proof. Consider the second order Taylor expansion of φppq with respect to φpp˚q. For an interpolation
point p1 “ γp` p1´ γqp˚,
φppq “ φpp˚q ` xp´ p˚ | ∇φpp˚qy `
1
2
xp´ p˚ | ∇2φpp1q | p´ p˚y.
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Notice that by the strong convexity assumption, λmin ą 0. Since ∇φpp˚q “ ~0, we get that
mint1, 1{λ2
max
u ¨
1
2
λminδ
2 ě φppq ´ φpp˚q “
1
2
xp´ p˚ | ∇2φpp1q | p´ p˚y ě
1
2
¨ λmin ¨ }p´ p
˚}2
2
.
In particular, we get that }p ´ p˚}2
2
ď δ
2
λ2max
. On the other hand, |zjppq ´ zjpp˚q| “ |fjppq ´ fjpp˚q| ď
}fppq ´ fpp˚q}2. Consider qpγq “ γp ` p1 ´ γqp˚. By the fundamental theorem of line integrals (a.k.a.
the gradient theorem), fjppq ´ fjpp˚q “
ş
1
0
x∇pfjpqpγqqq | p´ p
˚ydγ. Therefore,
}fppq ´ fpp˚q}2
2
“
ÿ
j
ˆż
1
0
x∇pfjpqpγqqq | p´ p
˚ydγ
˙2
ď
ÿ
j
ż
1
0
px∇pfjpqpγqqq | p´ p
˚yq2 dγ.
(The inequality is a Cauchy-Schwartz argument—consider the random variable x∇pfjpqpγqqq | p´ p˚y on
γ P r0, 1s endowed with the uniform probability measure.) Therefore, there exists γ P r0, 1s such that for
q “ qpγq we have
}fppq ´ fpp˚q}2
2
ď
ÿ
j
px∇pfjpqqq | p´ p
˚yq2 “ }∇2φpqq | p ´ p˚y}2
2
ď λ2
max
}p´ p˚}2
2
ď δ2.
This completes the proof. 
Corollary 9. For every sufficiently small δ ą 0, if φppq ď φpp˚q `min
!
1, 1
λ2max
)
¨ 1
2
λminδ
2
, then pp, xppqq
is a δ-approximate equilibrium in the sense of Definition 1.
A market with (non-linear) CES utilities is defined by a constant ρ P p´8, 0q Y p0, 1q, and con-
stants cij ě 0, for i “ 1, 2, . . . , n and j “ 1, 2, . . . , m. The utility function of agent i is uipxq “´řm
j“1 pcijxijq
ρ
¯1{ρ
.
1
Corollary 10 ([7]). Consider a market with non-linear CES utilities. There are constants κ1 “ κ1pb, c, ρq
and κ2 “ κ2pb, c, ρq such that the following holds. If ε ď 1κ1 , then for every δ ą 0 and for every
T ě
´κ2 ln p0min
ε2
¨ ln δ, the price-demand pair ppT , xT`1q is a δ-approximate equilibrium in the sense of
Definition 1.
The limit of a CES utility uipxq “
´řm
j“1 pcijxijq
ρ
¯1{ρ
as ρi Ñ 0 is called a Cobb-Douglas utility.
Explicitly, this puts uipxq “
śm
j“1 x
cij
ij . Markets with Cobb-Douglas utilities converge to equilibrium in
one step if we set ε “ 1. For a fixed ε ă 1, convergence to a δ-approximate equilibrium in Oplogp1{δqq
steps is easy to establish using the quantitative estimates of Banach’s fixed-point theorem, as the mapping
pt ÞÑ pt`1 is a contraction (using any choice of norm). Alternatively, Theorem 7 applied to Cobb-Douglas
utilities as well.
Corollary 11 ([11]). Corollary 10 applies also to markets with Cobb-Douglas utilities.
1We note that the definition and the following claim can be generalized easily to the case where for each player i there is a
different constant ρi instead of one uniform constant ρ.
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Some conventional utility functions, for example Leontief utilities, lead to markets that do not satisfy
the conditions of Theorem 7. Leontief utilities specifically are handled in [7] using the (weaker) bounds
on the convergence of gradient descent for more general convex functions. We offer here an alternative
approach using two ideas. One is a projection of the space of prices that enables us to replace the bounds
implied by strong convexity by similar bounds that do not require strong convexity. The other is a con-
vergence analysis of the multiplicative weights update method variety (which is known to be equivalent to
gradient descent—in fact it is a dual argument). More specifically, we use the following lemma, which is
a variant of the multiplicative weights update method. Its proof appears in the appendix.
Lemma 12. Let w “ maxj,t |zjpptq|, and let ε ď 12w . Also let v “ maxj
1
T
¨
řT´1
t“0 pzjpp
tqq2. Then,
1
T
¨
T´1ÿ
t“0
zjpp
tq ď εv `
lnp1{p0j q
εT
.
Using Lemma 12 directly to achieve convergence to equilibrium within an error parameter δ requires
a choice of ε that depends on δ. However, with some additional assumptions, one can use a fixed ε,
independent of δ. This is what we discuss next. We will need the following definition.
Definition 13. Let β be a function mapping R` to itself. An Eisenberg-Gale market is β-uniform in
a convex region P of price vectors (which contains an equilibrium vector p˚) iff for every α ą 0 and
for every p P P the following holds. If φppq ď φpp˚q ` βpαq, then |zjppq ´ zjpp˚q| ď α for every
j “ 1, 2, . . . , m.
Notice that Lemma 8 shows that if φ is strongly convex, then the market is β-uniform for βpαq “ Θpα2q.
Put W “ maxt1,maxpPP maxj zjppqu.
Lemma 14. Consider a β-uniform Eisenberg-Gale market. Suppose that there exists a constant κ ą
0 such that for every α, βpαq ě κ ¨ α2. Further suppose that for sufficiently small ε, the sequence
φpp0q, φpp1q, . . . is monotonically non-increasing. Then, for sufficiently small ε the following holds. For
every δ ą 0, if T ě W lnp1{p0minq
8ε2δ3
, then 1
T
¨
řT´1
t“0 zjpp
tq ď βpδq.
Proof. We assume that ε ď 1
2W
ď 1
2w
, and also that ε ď κ
64
. Trivially, for every T ,
1
T
¨
T´1ÿ
t“0
pzjpp
tqq2 ď w2.
By Lemma 12 we conclude that for every T ě T0 “ lnp1{p
0
minq
ε2w2
,
1
T
¨
T´1ÿ
t“0
zjpp
tq ď 2εw2 ď βpw{4q,
where the second inequality follows from ε ď κ
64
, with room to spare. This means that 1
1`βpw{4q
¨ 1
T
¨
řT
t“1 x
t
11
is a feasible primal solution of the Eisenberg-Gale convex program. Thus,
φpp˚q ě ψ
˜
1
1` βpw{4q
¨
1
T
¨
Tÿ
t“1
xt
¸
ě ψ
˜
1
T
¨
Tÿ
t“1
xt
¸
´ βpw{4q
ě
1
T
¨
Tÿ
t“1
ψpxtq ´ βpw{4q
“
1
T
¨
T´1ÿ
t“0
φpptq ´ βpw{4q
ě φp
1
T
¨
T´1ÿ
t“0
φpptqq ´ βpw{4q
ě φppT´1q ´ βpw{4q,
where the first inequality uses weak duality, the second inequality uses Claim 4, the third inequality uses
the concavity of ψ, the equation follows by construction (ψpxt`1q “ φpptq; see the proof of Lemma 3), the
fourth inequality uses the convexity of φ, and the fifth inequality uses the monotonicity of the sequence
φpp0q, φpp1q, . . . . We conclude that for every T ě T0, φppT q ´ φpp˚q ď βpw{4q, and therefore the
β-uniformity of the market implies that maxj |zjppT q ´ zjpp˚q| ď w4 , and in particular maxj zjpp
T q ď w
4
.
Next consider T ě T0 ` T1, where T1 “ 7T0. Consider j P t1, 2, . . . , mu. If zjpp˚q ă ´w4 , then for
every t ą T0 , zjpptq ă 0, so
1
T
¨
T´1ÿ
t“0
zjpp
tq ă
1
T
¨
T0ÿ
t“0
zjpp
tq ď
1
8
¨ 2εw2 ď βpw{8q.
Here again we’ve used in the last inequality ε ď κ
64
. Otherwise, if zjpp˚q ě ´w4 , then for every t ą T0,
zjpp
tq ě zjpp
˚q ´ w
4
ě ´w
2
. Also, for all j, zjpptq ď w4 . Therefore,
1
T
¨
T´1ÿ
t“0
pzjpp
tqq2 ď
1
8
¨ w2 `
7
8
¨ pw{2q2 ă 2pw{2q2.
Moreover, T ě 8T0 “ 8 lnp1{p0minq{ε2w2, so lnp1{p0minq{εT ď εpw{2q2. Therefore, by Lemma 12,
1
T
¨
T´1ÿ
t“0
zjpp
tq ď 3εpw{2q2 ď βpw{8q,
where the last inequality uses ε ď κ
64
. Using the same argument that we used for T ě T0, we can conclude
that for T ě T0 ` T1, maxj |zjppT q ´ zjpp˚q| ď w8 , so also maxj zjpp
T q ď w
8
.
More generally, suppose that we’ve verified that for every T ě T0 ` T1 ` ¨ ¨ ¨ ` Ti,
1
T
¨
T´1ÿ
t“0
zjpp
tq ď 3εpw{2iq2.
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As 3εpw{2iq2 ď βpw{2i`2q, we get that maxj |zjppT q ´ zjpp˚q| ď w{2i`2 and maxj zjppT q ď w{2i`2.
This immediately implies that for every j, one of the following two cases holds:
Case 1: zjppT q ă 0 for all T ě T0 ` T1 ` ¨ ¨ ¨ ` Ti.
Case 2: ´w{2i`1 ď zjppT q ď w{2i`2 for all T ě T0 ` T1 ` ¨ ¨ ¨ ` Ti.
Setting Ti`1 “ 7pT0 ` T1 ` ¨ ¨ ¨ ` Tiq, we satisfy the inductive hypothesis as follows. Consider
T ě T0 ` T1 ` ¨ ¨ ¨ ` Ti`1 and j P t1, 2, . . . , mu. If case 1 holds, then
1
T
¨
T´1ÿ
t“0
zjpp
tq ď
1
T
¨
T0`¨¨¨`Tiÿ
t“0
zjpp
tq ď
3
8
¨ εpw{2iq2 ă 3εpw{2i`1q2.
If case 2 holds, then
1
T
¨
T´1ÿ
t“0
pzjpp
tqq2 ď
T0w
2 ` T1pw{2q
2 ` ¨ ¨ ¨ ` Tipw{2
iq2 ` Ti`1pw{2
i`1q2
T0 ` T1 ` ¨ ¨ ¨ ` Ti`1
ď
ď
7
8
¨ pw{2i`1q2 `
7
8
¨
1
8
¨ pw{2iq2 `
7
8
¨
1
8
¨
1
8
pw{2i´1q2 ` ¨ ¨ ¨ ă 2pw{2i`1q2.
Also, T ě 8pT0 ` ¨ ¨ ¨ ` Tiq ě lnp1{p0minq{ε2pw{2i`1q2, so lnp1{p0minq{εT ď εpw{2i`1q2. Thus, by
Lemma 12,
1
T
¨
T´1ÿ
t“0
zjpp
tq ď 3εpw{2i`1q2.
This asserts the inductive hypothesis.
Finally, notice that if we choose imax ě log2pw{δq´ 2 we get that for every T ě T0`T1`¨ ¨ ¨`Timax ,
1
T
¨
T´1ÿ
t“0
zjpp
tq ď βpδq.
Finally, notice that
T0 ` ¨ ¨ ¨ ` Timax ă 8
imax`1 ¨
lnp1{p0
min
q
ε2w2
ď
w lnp1{p0
min
q
8ε2δ3
.
This concludes the proof of the lemma. 
The following lemma gives rather general conditions for the convergence of taˆtonnement in Fisher
markets.
Lemma 15. Consider a β-uniform Eisenberg-Gale market. Fix δ ą 0. Suppose that ε is sufficiently small
and T is sufficiently large so that the following conditions hold.
C1. The sequence φpp0q, φpp1q, . . . , φppT q is monotonically non-increasing.
C2. For every T 1 “ T ´ r3 lnp1{δq{δǫs , . . . , T and for every j “ 1, 2, . . . , m,
1
T 1 ` 1
¨
T 1ÿ
t“0
zjpp
tq ď βpδ{3q. (2)
Then, the price-demand pair ppT , xT`1q is a δ-approximate equilibrium in the sense of Definition 1.
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Proof. By construction, xT`1 “ xppT q.
Fix k P t0, 1, 2, . . . , r3 lnp1{δq{δεsu. Let E xt “ 1
T´k`1
¨
řT´k`1
t“1 x
t and let E pt “ 1
T´k`1
¨
řT´k
t“0 p
t
. By
condition C2, 1
1`βpδ{3q
¨E xt is a feasible primal solution. Therefore, we argue as in the proof of Lemma 14
that
φpp˚q ě ψ
ˆ
1
1` βpδ{3q
¨ E xt
˙
ě ψ
`
E xt
˘
´ βpδ{3q ě
1
T ´ k ` 1
¨
T´k`1ÿ
t“1
ψpxtq ´ βpδ{3q
“
1
T ´ k ` 1
¨
T´kÿ
t“0
φpptq ´ βpδ{3q ě φpE ptq ´ βpδ{3q ě φppT´kq ´ βpδ{3q.
The first inequality follows from weak duality, the second inequality follows from Claim 4, the third
inequality follows from the concavity of ψ, the equality follows by construction, the fourth inequality
follows from the convexity of φ, and the last inequality follows from condition C1 in the theorem. Rear-
ranging the terms, we get that φppT´kq ď φpp˚q ` βpδ{3q. Thus, because the market is β-uniform, we
have that |zjppT´kq ´ zjpp˚q| ď δ3 for every j “ 1, 2, . . . , m.
Consider j P t1, 2, . . . , mu. Notice that zjpp˚q ď 0. If zjpp˚q ě ´2δ3 then since for k “ 0 the above
argument gives |zjppT q ´ zjpp˚q| ď δ3 , we get that |zjpp
T q| ď δ. Otherwise, we have that zjppT´kq ă ´ δ3 ,
for k “ 0, 1, 2, . . . , r3 lnp1{δq{δεs. But, pT´r3 lnp1{δq{δεsj ď 1, and for every k P t0, 1, 2, . . . , r3 lnp1{δq{δεs´
1u, pT´kj ď p1´ δε{3qp
T´k´1
j . Thus, pTj ď p1´ δε{3qr3 lnp1{δq{δεs ď δ. 
When we apply Lemma 15 (using Lemma 14 to establish Condition C2) to Leontief utilities, our
approach gives somewhat weaker bounds on the convergence rate than those in [7]. However, we can use
this approach to handle the more general case of nested CES-Leontief utilities, which is our main result.
5 Nested CES-Leontief Utilities
In a market with nested CES-Leontief utilities every agent i “ 1, 2, . . . , n needs a set of “objects” Ji.
Each object J P Ji consists of a utility coefficient cJi ą 0, a set of goods (which we also denote by J),
and utility coefficients aJij ą 0 for all j P J . (To simplfy some of the expressions below we set aJij “ 0 for
all j R J .) The utility functions are formally given by uipxq “
´ř
JPJi
´
cJi minjPJ
!
xJij
aJij
)¯ρ¯1{ρ
, for some
ρ P p´8, 0q Y p0, 1q. W.l.o.g. we scale a and c so that }a}1 “ 1 and for every i,
ř
JPJi
pcJi q
ρ{p1´ρq “ 1.
(Notice that the behavior of agent i depends only on the relative values of the coordinates of ai and ci.)
Also, we may assume that for every good j there is at least one buyer i and at least one object J P Ji
for which j P J , otherwise the good has no demand and is can be discarded. The Eisenberg-Gale convex
program is given explicitly as:
max
$&%ÿ
i
bi ln
˜ÿ
JPJi
`
cJi u
J
i
˘ρ¸1{ρ
: @j “ 1, . . . , m,
nÿ
i“1
ÿ
JPJi
aJiju
J
i ď 1^ @i “ 1, . . . , n, @J P Ji, u
J
i ě 0
,.- .
The dual objective is
φppq “
mÿ
j“1
pj ´
nÿ
i“1
bi `
nÿ
i“1
bi ln
¨˝ÿ
JPJi
˜
bic
J
iřm
j“1 a
J
ijpj
¸ρ{p1´ρq‚˛p1´ρq{ρ .
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For a vector v P Rm, i P t1, 2, . . . , nu, and J P Ji, denote v˜Ji “
řm
j“1 a
J
ijvj . Also denote amin “
mini,JPJi,jPJ a
J
ij , A “ maxj
ř
i,JPJi
aJij , bmin “ mini bi, and cmin “ mini,JPJipcJi q
ρ
1´ρ
.
Claim 16. For every v P Rm, a2
min
¨ }v}2
2
ď }v˜}2
2
ď A ¨ }v}2
2
.
Proof. By definition, }v˜}2
2
“
ř
i
ř
JPJi
´ř
jPJ a
J
ijvj
¯2
. As every good j has an object J for which
j P J , then trivially
ř
i
ř
JPJi
´ř
jPJ a
J
ijvj
¯2
ě a2
min
}v}2
2
. On the other hand, using Cauchy-Schwartz,ř
i
ř
JPJi
´ř
jPJ a
J
ijvj
¯2
ď
ř
i
ř
JPJi
ř
jPJ a
J
ijv
2
j “
ř
j v
2
j ¨
ř
i
ř
JPJi
aJij ď A ¨ }v}
2
2
. 
We also need the following claim.
Claim 17. If for every agent i and for every J P Ji,
p˜Ji ě
"
2pρ´2q{p1´ρq ¨ bi ¨ c
2
min
if ρ ą 0,
2ρ´2b
1´ρ
i if ρ ă 0,
where p “ p0, then the same bounds hold for p “ pt, for all t.
Proof. Notice that for every agent i, the demand that i has for the object J P Ji given the prices p is
bi
p˜Ji
¨
pcJi {p˜
J
i q
ρ
1´ρř
J1PJi
pcJ
1
i {p˜
J1
i q
ρ
1´ρ
. Consider J0 P Ji that minimizes p˜J0i , and let J1 P J be any object for which
p˜J1i ď 2p˜
J0
i .
Let’s first consider ρ ą 0. Using the scaling of ci, we have that
ř
JPJi
pcJi {p˜
J
i q
ρ
1´ρ ď |Ji|{pp˜
J0
i q
ρ
1´ρ and
cmin ď
1
|Ji|
. Therefore, the demand that i has for J1 is at least bi¨c
2
min
21{p1´ρqp˜
J0
i
. This is a lower bound on xppqij
for every j P J1. Notice that if for all j P J1, xppqij ą 1, then p˜J1i must increase in the next time step.
Thus, we conclude that if p˜J0i ă 21{p1´ρq ¨ bi ¨ c2min then p˜
J1
i increases in the next time step.
A similar analysis applies to ρ ă 0. In this case we bound the demand that agent i has for J1 by using
the fact that for every J P Ji, p˜Ji ď 1. Therefore,
ř
JPJi
pp˜Ji {c
J
i q
´ρ
1´ρ ď |Ji| ¨ cmin ď 1. Using the fact that
pcJ1i q
ρ{p1´ρq ď 1 and p˜J0i ď p˜
J1
i ď 2p˜
J0
i , we get that the demand is at least bi
2pp˜
J0
i q
1{p1´ρq
. So if p˜J0i ă 2ρ´1 ¨b
1´ρ
i
then p˜J1i increases in the next time step.
Now the rest of the proof follows by induction on the number of time steps, assuming that the inequality
holds initially. Notice that in one iteration the prices never drop by more than a factor of 2 (because ε ď 1
2
).
So let q denote the new prices, and let J1 denote the object minimizing q˜Ji (over J P Ji). If p˜J1i ą 2p˜J0i ,
then the induction hypothesis holds trivially. Otherwise, we showed that there exists γ such that if p˜J0i ă γ
then q˜J1i ą p˜
J1
i . If indeed p˜J0i ă γ, then the induction hypothesis holds trivially. Otherwise, p˜J1i ě p˜J0i ě γ,
so q˜J1i ě
γ
2
, and this completes the proof. 
It is easy to verify that the Hessian ∇2φ of the dual objective function is given by
p∇2φppqqjl “
1
1´ ρ
¨
nÿ
i“1
bi ¨
˜ř
JPJi
aJija
J
ilppc
J
i q
ρ{pp˜Ji q
2´ρq
1
1´ρř
JPJi
pcJi {p˜
J
i q
ρ
p1´ρq
´ ρ ¨
´ř
JPJi
aJijppc
J
i q
ρ{p˜Ji q
1
1´ρ
¯
¨
´ř
JPJi
aJilppc
J
i q
ρ{p˜Ji q
1
1´ρ
¯
´ř
JPJi
pcJi {p˜
J
i q
ρ
p1´ρq
¯2 ‹˛‚.
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This allows us to prove the following bounds. Let P denote the set of price vectors that satisfy the
constraints of Proposition 6 and Claim 17.
Claim 18. There are constants Lmin “ Lminpb, c, ρq ą 0 and Lmax “ Lmaxpb, c, ρq ą 0 such that for every
x P Rm and for every p P P ,
Lmin ¨ }x˜}
2
2
ď xx | ∇2φppq | xy ď Lmax ¨ }x˜}
2
2
.
Proof. We begin with the following equation:
xx | ∇2φppq | xy “
1
1´ ρ
¨
nÿ
i“1
bi´ř
JPJi
pcJi {p˜
J
i q
ρ
p1´ρq
¯2 ¨
˜ÿ
JPJi
ÿ
J 1PJi
pcJi c
J 1
i q
ρ
1´ρ
˜
px˜Ji q
2
pp˜Ji q
2´ρ
1´ρ pp˜J
1
i q
ρ
1´ρ
´ ρ ¨
x˜Ji x˜
J 1
i
pp˜Ji q
1
1´ρ pp˜J
1
i q
1
1´ρ
¸¸
.
Fix i, denote XJ “ x˜Ji and qJ “ 1p˜Ji , then consider the term
ZJ,J 1 “ q
2´ρ
1´ρ
J q
ρ
1´ρ
J 1 X
2
J ´ ρ ¨ q
1
1´ρ
J q
1
1´ρ
J 1 XJXJ 1.
Put AJ,J 1 “ q
1´ρ{2
1´ρ
J q
ρ{2
1´ρ
J 1 . Because we sum over all J, J 1 P Ji, we can replace ZJ,J 1 by
1
2
¨
`
A2J,J 1X
2
J ` A
2
J 1,JX
2
J 1
˘
´ ρAJ,J 1AJ 1,JXJXJ 1 “
“
ρ
2
¨ pAJ,J 1XJ ` AJ 1,JXJ 1q
2 `
1´ ρ
2
¨
`
A2J,J 1X
2
J ` A
2
J 1,JX
2
J 1
˘
.
Let
L “
nÿ
i“1
bi ¨
ř
JPJi
ř
J 1PJi
´
pcJi c
J 1
i q
ρ
1´ρ {pp˜Ji q
2´ρ
1´ρ pp˜J
1
i q
ρ
1´ρ
¯
¨ px˜Ji q
2ř
JPJi
ř
J 1PJi
pcJi c
J 1
i q
ρ
p1´ρq {pp˜Ji p˜
J 1
i q
ρ
p1´ρq
.
We have that for ρ ą 0,
L ď xx | ∇2φppq | xy ď
1
1´ ρ
¨ L,
and for ρ ă 0,
1
1´ ρ
¨ L ď xx | ∇2φppq | xy ď L.
We proceed to bound L. Using Claim 17, the trivial upper bound }p˜}8 ď 1 (which follows from the
bounds }p}1 “ 1 and }a}1 “ 1), the notation bmin, cmin, and the fact that for all i, 1 ď |Ji| ď c
´ρ
1´ρ
min
, we get
the following lower and upper bounds on L. If ρ ą 0 we get that
2
ρpρ´2q
p1´ρq2 ¨ b
1
1´ρ
min
¨ c
2
1´ρ
min
¨ }x˜}2
2
ď L ď 2
2´ρ
p1´ρq2 ¨ b
´2
1´ρ
min
¨ c
´p4`ρq
1´ρ
min
¨ }x˜}2
2
.
Similarly, if ρ ă 0 we get that
2
ρp2´ρq
1´ρ ¨ b1´ρ
min
¨ }x˜}2
2
ď L ď 2
p3ρ´2qpρ´2q
1´ρ ¨ b3ρ´2
min
¨ c
ρ
1´ρ
min
¨ }x˜}2
2
.
This completes the proof. 
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Corollary 19. There is a constant λmax “ λmaxpa, b, c, ρq such that for every x P Rm and for every p P P ,
}∇2φppq | xy}2
2
ď λ2
max
}x˜}2
2
.
Proof. First notice that }∇2φppq | xy}2
2
ď maxy‰~0
xy|∇2φppq|yy
}y}22
¨ xx | ∇2φppq | xy. By Claim 18, xy |
∇2φppq | yy ď Lmax ¨ }y˜}
2
2
. By Claim 16, }y˜}2
2
ď A ¨ }y}2
2
. Using Claim 18 again, xx | ∇2φppq | xy ď
Lmax ¨ }x˜}
2
2
. Summing up the inequalities, }∇2φppq | xy}2
2
ď A ¨ L2
max
¨ }x˜}2
2
. 
We are now ready to establish the monotonicity of the dual objective function.
Claim 20. For sufficiently small ε, the sequence φpptq, t “ 0, 1, 2, . . . , is monotonically non-increasing.
Proof. Write pt`1 “ pt ´ qt, where for every j “ 1, 2, . . . , m, qtj “ ´εptjzjpptq. By Lemma 3, qtj “
εptjp∇φpp
tqqj . Consider the second order Taylor expansion of φpptq with respect to φppt`1q.
φpptq “ φppt`1q ` xqt | ∇φppt`1qy `
1
2
xqt | ∇2φppq | qty,
where p “ γpt` p1´ γqpt`1 for some γ P r0, 1s. As φ is a convex function on P and p P P , the quadratic
term in the Taylor expansion is non-negative. Thus, our proof is complete if we show that the linear term
is also non-negative.
Write ∇φppt`1q “ ∇φpptq ` p∇φppt`1q ´∇φpptqq. Thus,
xqt | ∇φppt`1qy “ xqt | ∇φpptqy ` xqt | ∇φppt`1 ´∇φpptqqy
“ ε ¨
mÿ
j“1
ptjp∇φpp
tqq2j ´ ε ¨
mÿ
j“1
ptjp∇φpp
tqqj
nÿ
i“1
pxt`2ij ´ x
t`1
ij q.
Let fppq P Rm` denote the vector of total demands for the goods induced by xppq. In particular, fpptq “řn
i“1 x
t`1
i . In order to complete the proof we show that for sufficiently small ε,
mÿ
j“1
ptjp∇φpp
tqqjpfjpp
t`1q ´ fjpp
tqq ď
mÿ
j“1
ptjp∇φpp
tqq2j .
Let ppγq “ p1´ γqpt ` γpt`1, for γ P r0, 1s. By the fundamental theorem of line integrals,
fjpp
t`1q ´ fjpp
tq “
ż
1
0
x∇fjpppγqq | p
t`1 ´ ptydγ “
ż
1
0
x´∇fjpppγqq | q
tydγ.
Using Lemma 3, ´p∇fjpppγqqqj1 “ p∇2φpppγqqqj,j1. We get that
mÿ
j“1
ptjp∇φpp
tqqjpfjpp
t`1q ´ fjpp
tqq “
mÿ
j“1
ptjp∇φpp
tqqj
ż
1
0
x´∇fjpppγqq | q
tydγ
“ ε ¨
mÿ
j“1
ptjp∇φpp
tqqj
ż
1
0
mÿ
j1“1
p∇2φpppγqqqj,j1 ¨ p
t
j1p∇φpp
tqqj1dγ
“ ε ¨
ż
1
0
mÿ
j“1
mÿ
j1“1
ptjp∇φpp
tqqjp
t
j1p∇φpp
tqqj1p∇
2φpppγqqqj,j1dγ.
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This implies that there exists γ P r0, 1s such that for p “ ppγq,
mÿ
j“1
ptjp∇φpp
tqqjpfjpp
t`1q ´ fjpp
tqq ď ε ¨
mÿ
j“1
mÿ
j1“1
ptjp∇φpp
tqqjp
t
j1p∇φpp
tqqj1p∇
2φppqqj,j1
Define x by putting xj “ ptjp∇φpptqqj , for all j. By Claim 18, there is Lmax “ Lmaxpb, c, ρq ą 0 such that
for every x, xx | ∇2φppq | xy ď Lmax ¨ }x˜}22. Recall that A “ maxj
ř
i,J a
J
ij . We get
mÿ
j“1
ptjp∇φpp
tqqjpfjpp
t`1q ´ fjpp
tqq ď ε ¨ xx | ∇2φppq | xy
ď ε ¨ Lmax ¨ }x˜}
2
2
“ ε ¨ Lmax ¨
ÿ
i,J
˜
mÿ
j“1
aJijp
t
jp∇φpp
tqqj
¸2
ď ε ¨ Lmax ¨
ÿ
i,J
mÿ
j“1
aJijp
t
jp∇φpp
tqq2j
“ ε ¨ Lmax ¨
mÿ
j“1
ptjp∇φpp
tqq2j ¨
ÿ
i,J
aJij
ď ε ¨ Lmax ¨A ¨
mÿ
j“1
ptjp∇φpp
tqq2j ,
where the penultimate inequality uses Cauchy-Schwartz. Choosing ε ď 1
Lmax¨A
completes the proof. 
Claim 21. A Fisher market with nested CES-Leontief utilities is β-uniform, for β that satisfies βpαq “
Θpα2q.
Proof. Let p˚ P P be a dual optimal solution. We show that there exists a constant κ ą 0 such that for
every δ ą 0 and for every p P P , if φppq ď φpp˚q ` κ ¨ δ2, then |zppq ´ zpp˚q|8 ď δ.
Consider the second order Taylor expansion of φppq with respect to φpp˚q:
φppq “ φpp˚q ` xp´ p˚ | ∇φpp˚qy `
1
2
xp´ p˚ | ∇2φpp1q | p´ p˚y.
Notice that p∇φpp˚qqj “ 0 unless p˚j “ 0, in which case both p∇φpp˚qqj ě 0 and pj ´ p˚j ě 0, so
xp´ p˚ | ∇φpp˚qy ě 0. We get that for a constant Lmin ą 0,
κδ2 ě φppq ´ φpp˚q ě
1
2
xp´ p˚ | ∇2φpp1q | p´ p˚y ě
1
2
¨ Lmin ¨ }Čp´ p˚}22,
where the last inequality follows from Claim 18. Thus, }Čp´ p˚}2
2
ď 2κδ
2
Lmin
. On the other hand, |zjppq ´
zjpp
˚q| “ |fjppq ´ fjpp
˚q| ď }fppq ´ fpp˚q}2. Consider qpγq “ γp ` p1 ´ γqp˚. By the fundamental
theorem of line integrals, fjppq ´ fjpp˚q “
ş
1
0
x∇pfjpqpγqqq | p´ p
˚ydγ. Therefore,
}fppq ´ fpp˚q}2
2
“
ÿ
j
ˆż
1
0
x∇pfjpqpγqqq | p´ p
˚ydγ
˙2
ď
ÿ
j
ż
1
0
px∇pfjpqpγqqq | p´ p
˚yq2 dγ.
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(The inequality is a Cauchy-Schwartz argument—consider the random variable x∇pfjpqpγqqq | p´ p˚y on
γ P r0, 1s endowed with the uniform probability measure.) Therefore, there exists γ P r0, 1s such that for
q “ qpγq we have
}fppq ´ fpp˚q}2
2
ď
ÿ
j
px∇pfjpqqq | p´ p
˚yq2 “ }∇2φpqq | p´ p˚y}2
2
ď λ2
max
¨ }Čp´ p˚}2
2
ď
2κδ2λ2
max
Lmin
,
where the last inequality follows from Corollary 19 and λmax is the constant stipulated by that corollary.
To complete the proof, choose κ “ Lmin
2λ2max
. 
We are now ready for the proof of convergence of taˆtonnement in Fisher markets with nested CES-
Leontief utilities.
Theorem 22. There are constants κ1 “ κ1pa, b, c, ρq and κ2 “ κ2pa, b, c, ρq such that the following holds.
If ε ď 1
κ1
, then for every δ ą 0 and for every T ě κ2 lnp1{p0minq
ε2δ3
, the price-demand pair ppT , xT`1q is a
δ-approximate equilibrium in the sense of Definition 1.
Proof. By Claim 21 and Claim 20, the conditions stated in Lemma 14 are satisfied, so the conclusion of
the lemma holds. The two claims and the lemma together establish the conditions stated in Lemma 15,
which in turn shows the convergence claim and rate stated in the theorem. 
6 Additional Results
A market with resource allocation utilities is similar to a market with nested CES-Leontief utilities, except
that ρ is set to 1 in the case of resource allocation utilities. In other words, the utility functions are given
by uipxq “
ř
JPJi
cJi minjPJi
!
xJij
aJij
)
. Resource allocation markets generalize both Leontief utilities and
linear utilities. The taˆtonnement process is not known to converge in the case of linear utilities (and in fact
is unlikely to converge in that case), so we need to apply the process to distorted utilities (see [11] for the
case of linear utilities). Notice that the reactions of the buyers are assumed to be optimal with respect to
the distorted utilities and not the original utilities. (In the proportional response dynamics that converge to
equilibrium in the case of linear utilities [5] the agents also do not respond optimally to the prices.)
We will replace the utility function of each agent by a nested CES-Leontif utility. This is detailed in
the proof of the following theorem that analyzes the distorted utilities process.
Theorem 23. Let k “ maxi |Ji|. For every δ ą 0 there are constants κ0 “ κ0pcq, κ1 “ κ1pa, bq, and
κ2 “ κ2pa, b, cq such that the following holds. For ε ď 1
κ
log2 k{δ2
0 κ
log k{δ
1
, and T ě κ2 lnp1{p
0
min
q
ε2δ3
, the price-
demand pair ppT , xT`1q is a δ-approximate equilibrium in the sense of Definition 2.
Proof. We replace the utility functions by their distorted versions u˜ipxq “
´ř
JPJi
´
cJi minjPJi
!
xJij
aJij
)¯ρ¯1{ρ
,
for ρ “ 1´ δ
4 lnk
. We apply Theorem 22 to get prices p and allocations x that are a δ
2
-approximate equilib-
rium in the sense of Definition 1 for the utilities u˜i. Notice that by properties P2 and P3 of Definition 1, the
allocations x˜ “ 1
1`δ{2
x satisfy properties P2 and P3 of Definition 2. Moreover, as the distorted utility func-
tions are 1-homogeneous (this is also true of resource allocation utilities), u˜ipx˜q “ 11`δ{2 u˜ipxq. To com-
plete the proof, denote by x˚ the optimal allocations with respect to the prices p for the original resource
19
allocation utilities. We have that for every i “ 1, 2, . . . , n, uipx˜q ě k1´1{ρ ¨ u˜ipx˜q ě p1 ´ δ{2q ¨ u˜ipx˜q “
1´δ{2
1`δ{2
¨ u˜ipxq ě
1´δ{2
1`δ{2
¨ u˜ipx
˚q ě 1´δ{2
1`δ{2
¨ uipx
˚q ě p1 ´ δq ¨ uipx
˚q. This establishes property P1 of
Definition 2. 
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Appendix: Proofs
PROOF OF LEMMA 3. By the definition of g˚i ,
φppq “ max
xPRnˆm``
#
nÿ
i“1
bi ln uipxiq `
mÿ
j“1
pj
˜
1´
nÿ
i“1
xij
¸+
.
Let φxpqq “
řn
i“1 bi lnuipxiq `
řm
j“1 qj p1´
řn
i“1 xijq. This is a linear function of q. Notice that φpqq “
maxx φxpqq. Fix x to be a maximizing assignment for q “ p. By a well-known fact, ∇φppq “ ∇φxppq.
But φxppq is a linear function of p and its gradient is given by p∇φxppqqj “ 1´
řn
i“1 xij .
Now, to complete the proof, we show that the maximizing assignment x for q “ p is x “ xppq. Notice
that
arg max
xPRnˆm``
#
nÿ
i“1
bi ln uipxiq `
mÿ
j“1
pj
˜
1´
nÿ
i“1
xij
¸+
“
arg max
xPRnˆm``
#
nÿ
i“1
bi ln uipxiq `
mÿ
j“1
pj
˜
nÿ
i“1
xijppq ´
nÿ
i“1
xij
¸+
,
because the expressions on both sides of the equation differ only by an additive constant that does not
depend on x. Finally, notice that the solution to the right-hand side is an equilibrium demand for the
same agents, but where the supply of each good j is equal to
řn
i“1 xijppq. The equilibrium demand in this
market is precisely xppq. 
PROOF OF LEMMA 12. The proof uses the standard potential function argument analyzing the mul-
tiplicative weights update method. We begin with the following inequality that holds for every t “
0, 1, 2, . . . .
mÿ
j“1
pt`1j “
mÿ
j“1
ptj
`
1` εzjpp
tq
˘
“
mÿ
j“1
ptj ` ε ¨
˜
mÿ
j“1
ptj
¸
¨
mÿ
j“1
ptjřm
j1“1 p
t
j1
zjpp
tq
“
˜
mÿ
j“1
ptj
¸
¨
˜
1` ε
mÿ
j“1
ptjřm
j1“1 p
t
j1
zjpp
tq
¸
ď
˜
mÿ
j“1
ptj
¸
¨ e
ε
řm
j“1 p
t
jzjpp
tq{
řm
j1“1 p
t
j1 .
So, on the one hand,
mÿ
j“1
pTj ď
˜
mÿ
j“1
p0j
¸
¨ e
ε
řT´1
t“0
řm
j“1 p
t
jzjpp
tq{
řm
j1“1 p
t
j1 .
On the other hand, for every k P t1, 2, . . . , mu,
mÿ
j“1
pTj ě p
T
k “ p
0
k ¨
T´1ź
t“0
`
1` εzkpp
tq
˘
.
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Taking the logarithms of the lower and upper bounds for
řm
j“1 p
T
j , we get that
T´1ÿ
t“0
ln
`
1` εzkpp
tq
˘
ď ln
˜řm
j“0 p
0
j
p0k
¸
` ε ¨
T´1ÿ
t“0
mÿ
j“1
ptjřm
j1“1 p
t
j1
zjpp
tq.
The second term on the right-hand side equals 0 (see the proof of Lemma 5 and recall that zjpptq “
1´
řn
i“1 xpp
tqij). Using the fact that lnp1` ξq ě ξ ´ ξ2 for every ξ P
“
´1
2
,`1
2
‰
, we get that
T´1ÿ
t“0
εzkpp
tq ´
T´1ÿ
t“0
ε2pzkpp
tqq2 ď ln
˜řm
j“1 p
0
j
p0k
¸
.
Averaging over t, we get that
1
T
¨
T´1ÿ
t“0
zkpp
tq ď
1
T
¨
lnp1{p0kq
ε
`
1
T
¨
T´1ÿ
t“0
ε ¨ pzkpp
tqq2 ď
lnp1{p0kq
εT
` εv.
(Recall that we scale b so thatřmj“1 p0j “ řni“1 bi “ 1.) 
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